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We construct Edgeworth exchange economies equivalent to demand and supply environments
typically used in bargaining models and market experiments. This formulation clearly delin-
eates environment, institution, and behavior for these models and experiments. To illustrate,
we examine results by Gode and Sunder, who simulate random behavior in a double auc-
tion and argue that this institution leads to an eﬃcient allocation, even in the absence of
rationality. We use the Edgeworth exchange representation of their economic environment to
demonstrate that they model individually rational behavior, and show that their model is a
special case of theoretical results by Hurwicz, Radner, and Reiter.
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1 Introduction
Market experiments typically use the technique of induced supply and demand. Through
use of this tool, the extensive literature on experimental markets has empirically established
performance properties of several market institutions under a variety of economic environ-
ments and information structures.1 Although induced supply and demand is an eﬀective
∗ This paper is a substantial revision of “A General Equilibrium Structure for Induced Supply and De-
mand” (UCSD Economics Discussion Paper 96-35).
1Smith [1982] provides a thorough description of the theory and techniques of induced supply and demand.
For extensive surveys of the literature and results on these issues, see Plott [1982] and Smith [1982].
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experimental technique, it can lead to problems in interpretation, since many theoretical
models of resource allocation are formulated in terms of utility functions and endowments.
The objective of our paper is to develop a framework that facilitates interpretation of bar-
gaining models and experiments by spanning this gap between theory and experiment.
We formulate market experiments as Edgeworth exchange economies by demonstrating
that a buyer’s induced demand schedule and a seller’s induced supply schedule can each
be represented as a quasi-linear utility function with an appropriate endowment, and show
that the induced supply and demand formulation typical of market experiments is equiv-
alent to an Edgeworth exchange economy. With this formulation we examine a result by
Gode and Sunder [1993] (henceforth GS), who simulate bargaining in a double auction,
and conclude that the structure of this market institution drives convergence to a Pareto
optimum, even when agents do not seek proﬁts and their bids are random. We demonstrate
that when viewed as an Edgeworth exchange economy, agents in their model exhibit indi-
vidual rationality, by which we mean that no agent attempts to take part in a trade that
fails to increase, or at least leaves constant, his own utility.2 The high eﬃciency observed in
the GS simulations in fact results from this individual rationality coupled with the agents’
quasi-linear utility functions. Furthermore, we show that the GS simulation model is a
special case of an analytic model developed earlier by Hurwicz, Radner, and Reiter [1975]
(henceforth HRR).
Our analysis in this paper is similar to the approach that Hurwicz [1995] takes in his
critique of the “Coase theorem” (Coase [1960]). Hurwicz shows that Coase’s result – which
states roughly that eﬃciency in a market with externalities is independent of the assignment
of property rights – holds only in the case of quasi-linear utility. Consequently, Hurwicz’s
recognition of the implicit preference structure underlying Coase’s model has led to a rein-
terpretation of the scope of Coase’s result. In this paper we reformulate supply and demand
environments, commonly studied in market experiments, as Edgeworth exchange economies
and use this formulation to reinterpret the nature and scope of the GS model.
2 The Edgeworth formulation of induced supply and demand
In this section, we describe induced supply and demand environments and formulate these
environments as Edgeworth exchange economies. With this formulation, we develop an
2 This deﬁnition follows Luce and Raiﬀa [1957], pp. 192-3.EDGEWORTH EXCHANGE FORMULATION 3
example of the Edgeworth exchange representation of a supply and demand environment.
2.1 Relationship between induced demand and quasi-linear utility
In this subsection we describe an induced demand function, construct a quasi-linear utility
function from the demand function, and then show that the demand function may be derived
from constrained maximization of the quasi-linear utility function, provided the buyer’s
endowment is large enough to yield an interior solution to the maximization problem.
2.1.1 Induced demand and quasi-linear utility
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We use the buyer’s redemption value function rj(·) to develop the buyer’s quasi-linear
utility function. Deﬁne the consumption space of buyer j as X ×Y .L e t( xj,y j) ∈ X × Y
denote the number of units of the currency and commodity held by buyer j. Deﬁne the
utility function for buyer j as
uj(x, y)=x + rj(y)+Mj (1)
where Mj is a constant.3 Equation (1) is linear in the currency (X) and additively separable
in the currency and commodity, i.e., it is quasi-linear.4





j is suﬃcient to guarantee that buyer j would be
able to purchase each unit at any price at or below the value of the unit.







j) = 0 so that the autarky outcome has a payoﬀ of 0.
4 Our rationalization of the induced demand schedule as the solution to the constrained maximization
of a quasi-linear utility function is similar to the construction by Smith [1982, p. 932]. Smith derives the
induced demand curve by maximizing the utility function uj(xj,y )=xj + vj(yj) subject to the budget
constraint xj +py j ≤ 0w h e r exj ≤ 0a n dyj ≥ 0. In contrast, we deﬁne ﬁnite positive endowments of X for
buyers and sellers that are consistent with the typical speciﬁcation of consumer choice problems.EDGEWORTH EXCHANGE FORMULATION 4
2.1.2 Derivation of induced demand from utility
Lemma 1 Buyer j’s demand for Y – derived from maximization of equation (1) for a
suﬃciently large endowment – is characterized by vj.
Proof The vector vj of valuations is non-increasing, so that the total valuation function
vj(y) is (weakly) concave for y ∈ Yj. Therefore the utility function uj(x, y)=x+Mj+vj(y)
is (weakly) quasi-concave. The theorem of the maximum implies that for any given price p
of good Y , the set of values that maximize uj(·) is convex.
Let yj(p) be the demand of buyer j at price p, i.e., the solution to the maximization
problem for uj(x, y). We complete the proof of the lemma by showing that the demand
yj(p) has the same graph as the vector vj of values. If p = vk
j, then yj(p) ∈{ k − 1,k }.I f
p ∈ (vk+1
j ,v k
j), then yj(p)=k, for a suﬃciently large endowment.
2.2 Relationship between induced supply and quasi-linear utility
In this subsection we describe an induced supply function, construct a quasi-linear utility
function from this supply function, and then show that the supply function may be de-
rived from constrained maximization of the quasi-linear utility function, with a commodity
endowment of Y equal to the number of units for which the seller has a ﬁnite unit cost.
2.2.1 Induced supply schedule and quasi-linear utility
The supply function for seller i is given by his marginal cost schedule, which is represented





i ). Seller i has ﬁnite selling capacity, so that the
marginal cost of any unit beyond mi is inﬁnite. Element ck
i is interpreted as the marginal
cost incurred by seller i when he produces his kth unit. For k = {0, 1, 2,...,m i} the
redemption value for seller i when he sells k units is
ri(k)=
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We use the seller’s redemption value function to develop the seller’s quasi-linear utility





x + ri(mi − y), 0 ≤ y ≤ mi;
x, y > mi.
(2)
Set the commodity endowment for seller i to y0
i = mi.EDGEWORTH EXCHANGE FORMULATION 5
2.2.2 Derivation of induced supply from utility
Lemma 2 Seller i’s supply of Y , which is derived from maximization of equation (2), is
characterized by ci.
Proof The vector ci of costs is non-decreasing, so that the total valuation function ri(k)
is (weakly) concave for k ∈{ 1, 2,...,y0
i },a si sri(y0
i −y)f o ry ∈{ 1, 2,...,y0
i }. Therefore
the utility function ui(x, y)=x+ri(y0
i −y) is (weakly) quasi-concave. The theorem of the
maximum implies that for any given price p of good Y , the set of values that maximize ui(·)
is convex.
Let yi(p) be the supply of seller i at price p, i.e., the solution to the maximization
problem for ui(x, y). We complete the proof of the lemma by showing that the supply yi(p)
has the same graph as the vector ci of costs. If p = ck
i , then yi(p) ∈{ y0
i −k, y0
i −k +1}.I f
p ∈ (ck
i ,c k+1
i ), then yi(p)=y0
i − k.
2.3 Example
Figure 1 (a) shows a simple example of an induced supply and demand environment. In the
example there is one seller with cost vector ci =( 1 , 3, 5, 7) and one buyer with the vector
of values vj =( 8 , 6, 4, 2).
Figures 1 (b) and (c) show indiﬀerence curves for the buyer and for the seller. The
buyer has endowment (x0,y0)=( 2 0 ,0), the utility function dual to the vector of valuations
vj = {8, 6, 4, 2}, and the constant Mj = −20. Figure 1 (b) shows three indiﬀerence
curves for the utility function uj(x, y), constructed using equation (1). The indiﬀerence
curves uj(x, y)=4a n duj(x, y) = 6 are horizontal translations of the indiﬀerence curve
uj(x, y) = 0, i.e., preferences are quasi-linear. Figure 1 (b) also shows the buyer’s demand
for two prices: p =4 ,a n dp = 5. When the price is p = 4 (which is equal to v3
j) the
set of utility maximizing choices of the commodity (Y )i syj(4) ∈{ 2, 3}.I f p = 5 then
p ∈ (4, 6) = (v3
j,v 2
j), so the demand is yj(5) = 2. The budget sets generated by these two
prices are depicted in Figure 1 (b), along with the utility maximizing choice sets associated
with these prices. Figure 1 (c), which shows several indiﬀerence curves for the seller with
the utility function deﬁned in equation (2), is interpreted analogously to Figure 1 (b). The
buyer’s and seller’s utility functions are combined in the Edgeworth diagram in Figure 1 (d).
We can see in Figure 1 (d) that the range of competitive equilibrium prices in the
Edgeworth exchange representation of this example is p ∈ [4,5], just as when the exampleEDGEWORTH EXCHANGE FORMULATION 6
is represented as an induced supply and demand environment in Figure 1 (a). At the lower
price ratio, p =
py
px = 4, which is the steeper price line in Figure 1 (d), the buyer is indiﬀerent
between 2 and 3 units and the seller would like to sell 2 units. This of course corresponds
to the net demands for buyer and seller in Figure 1 (a). A similar observation holds for the
high end of the equilibrium price range (p =5 ) .
uA(x, y)=0 
uA(x, y)=4   
uA(x, y)=6 
uB(x, y)=0 
uB(x, y)=4   
uB(x, y)=6 
(a) Supply and demand (b) Buyer’s utility













































Figure 1: Supply and demand, indiﬀerence curves, and Edgeworth diagram.EDGEWORTH EXCHANGE FORMULATION 7
3 The “ZI” model, individual rationality, and the B-process
The framework developed in Section 2 can be used to clarify aspects of the model by Gode
and Sunder [1993] of “zero-intelligence” (ZI) traders. Their model shows that the bargaining
behavior of these traders, whose actions are random bids and oﬀers in a double auction
trading institution, leads to eﬃcient outcomes. This is often considered surprising, since
(according to GS) ZI agents “do not maximize or seek proﬁts.”5 There are three conclusions
that we draw from the Edgeworth exchange representation of the GS simulations. First,
their agents exhibit individual rationality (according to the deﬁnition of Luce and Raiﬀa
[1957]) and as a result, they do in fact seek proﬁts. Secondly, we compare agent behavior
and the market institution that GS employ in their simulations to the results in Hurwicz,
Radner, and Reiter [1975] (HRR) and show that it is this proﬁt seeking behavior that
produces eﬃcient outcomes in the GS model. Finally, we examine performance of ZI agents
in environments with non-convexities and show that their result is not as general as the
HRR result.
3.1 The “ZI” model reinterpreted
The DA market simulations in GS ﬁt perfectly into the Edgeworth exchange representa-
tion developed in Section 2. GS report results of simulations with two primary treatment
variables. We focus our attention on the treatment in which high allocative eﬃciency is
observed: the treatment that they refer to as “budget constrained.” In this treatment, each
buyer has a positive valuation for a single unit, and each seller can sell a single unit at some
positive marginal cost. Bargaining in the Gode and Sunder model takes place in a double
auction. In this institution, those sellers who have not already sold their unit may submit
an ask at any time, and those buyers who have not already purchased a unit may submit
a bid at any time. When a bid and an ask cross, a trade occurs at a price that is equal to
the bid if the bid precedes the ask or at the ask if the ask precedes the bid.
A buyer in the GS model submits bids that are drawn from a uniform distribution
between 0 and her unit value; likewise, a seller submits asks that are randomly drawn
between his unit cost and some upper bound. According to GS, “the market forbade traders
to buy or sell at a loss because then they would not have been able to settle their accounts.”
This argument is inconsistent in the case of sellers, since each seller has an endowment
5See GS [1993, p. 120]. Emphasis added.EDGEWORTH EXCHANGE FORMULATION 8
of a single unit of the commodity, and would therefore be able to settle any trade at a
non-negative price. In the case of a buyer, a natural interpretation of her inability to settle
her account is that she does not have suﬃcient currency endowment to purchase at the
negotiated price. Viewed within the framework of Section 2, the constraint that GS impose
implies that buyer i has a currency endowment x0
i equal to her unit value. Therefore, for
each buyer the set of feasible trades6 is identical to the set of individually rational trades.
This ambiguity allows one to interpret “ZI” buyer behavior in either of two ways: (1) a
buyer submits random bids from her feasible set of trades, or (2) a buyer submits bids that
lie in her upper contour set. Since the ﬁrst explanation is consistent only if each buyer’s
endowment is equal to the buyer’s valuation, and since this is not generically true, we adopt
the second explanation, and conclude that the “ZI” traders exhibit individual rationality.
We now have a complete description of a stochastic process and a microeconomic system
in which performance can be evaluated. Their simulations generate high allocative eﬃciency
in all markets. An eﬃciency loss can only occur when there is a trade of an extra-marginal
unit (that is, a unit with a value below or a unit with a cost above the competitive equilib-
rium price). The double auction that GS consider prevents buyers from reselling a unit to
another buyer with a higher valuation, and prevents a seller from purchasing from a seller
with a lower unit cost.7 When this result was ﬁrst introduced, it was considered surprising.
However, when viewed from the perspective of the equivalent Edgeworth exchange repre-
sentation, it is apparent that the high allocative eﬃciency observed when agents randomly
propose trades in their upper contour sets is a special case of the HRR model, as we describe
in the next subsection.
3.2 The ZI model and the B-process
The B-process is a simple non-tatonnement trading institution. With a discrete commodity
space, as in a market experiment, random sequences of proposed trades submitted from
each agent result in a sequence of net trades. An element of the sequence of net trades is
non-zero if submitted proposals include a compatible trade (i.e., there is at least one subset
of trade proposals for which net trades sum to zero). HRR show under weak conditions
6 ‘Feasible’ trade here means that a trade is feasible for both parties given their endowments and also
that the trade is permissible under the rules of the institution.
7 In a sequel to GS, Gode and Sunder [1997] present an analysis of the magnitude of expected eﬃciency
losses in their simulations.EDGEWORTH EXCHANGE FORMULATION 9
on preferences and technologies that if at every iteration of the bargaining process, each
individual only submits trade proposals from their individually feasible and rational choice
set, then the process converges to a Pareto optimal allocation in ﬁnite time.
This result applies to a wide class of environments that includes (but is not limited
to) the one that GS consider. Recall that we earlier demonstrated that the GS “budget
constrained” agents generate proposed trades randomly from their individually rational and
feasible choice sets. The strong similarity between the HRR and the GS models generates
optimism that the GS results are robust. For example, it would be interesting to know
whether ZI behavior in a single unit sequential double auction generates Pareto optimal
outcomes for any private good economy without externalities. Unfortunately this is not
the case: there are many environments for which ZI behavior does not generate Pareto
optimal outcomes in the DA. In fact, we have already seen that trades which include extra-
marginal units, combined with the prohibition on retrading, can lead to non-Pareto optimal
outcomes even in quasi-linear environments. Even if we dismiss this scenario as unrealistic
since many markets allow agents to act as a buyer and seller, there are still classes of
environments for which Pareto optimal outcomes are not guaranteed. We identify these
classes of environments by examining diﬀerences between the double auction adopted by




















Figure 2: Edgeworth diagram with nonconvexity in preferences.
In the double auctions GS consider, each contract is for a ﬁxed quantity of one unitEDGEWORTH EXCHANGE FORMULATION 10
of the commodity (Y ); in the B-process contracts do not have a quantity restriction. The
quantity restriction can prevent convergence to a Pareto optimal allocation. Figure 2 shows
a simple Edgeworth exchange economy in which agent A (the buyer of commodity Y )h a s
convex preferences, but agent B has a nonconvexity. The endowment point for A and B is
shown as a square at (3.5,1) (from the perspective of A). The agents’ indiﬀerence curves
are presented for the endowments: A’s indiﬀerence curve is marked by ﬁlled circles at its
kinks and B’s indiﬀerence curve is marked by the empty circles at its kinks. If A and B
adopt “ZI” behavior in a single unit double auction, then the set of bids for one unit of
commodity Y that would increase the utility of agent A are depicted by the set SA and
the set of oﬀers that would increase the utility of agent B are represented by the set SB.
(In the representation for agent B, we assume, as in the GS model, that there is an upper
bound on the oﬀers that are made by a seller, although the seller would beneﬁt from oﬀers
above this upper bound if the oﬀer were accepted.) Since there is no overlap in these two
supports no Pareto improving trade will be realized. However, a Pareto improving trade





px = 1. The
HRR model guarantees convergence to a Pareto optimum, even in the case of non-convexity
of one of the agent’s indiﬀerence curves, but we see easily in the Edgeworth representation
that non-convexity can impede convergence with quantity restrictions.
4 Conclusions
The method of induced costs and values is a powerful and eﬀective tool for conducting
market experiments and deﬁning bargaining models. However, our Edgeworth exchange
formulation is a potent tool for interpreting and understanding these bargaining models and
market experiments.
In Section 3 we demonstrate that the Edgeworth formulation of supply and demand
environments clariﬁes the role of behavior and institution in the Gode and Sunder simula-
tions of “Zero-intelligence” bargaining in the double auction. Once agents’ objectives are
represented as quasi-linear utility functions and these are combined to create an Edgeworth
exchange economy, it is apparent that their behavior is individually rational and that the
result of the ZI model is a special case of the B-process model by Hurwicz, Radner, and
Reiter, who show analytically that individual rationality is suﬃcient to produce Pareto
optimal outcomes for randomly generated bids in the B-process.EDGEWORTH EXCHANGE FORMULATION 11
Since individual rationality in these mechanisms is suﬃcient to achieve Pareto optimal
outcomes in an Edgeworth exchange economy with quasi-linear utility, it is natural to ask
what behavior is suﬃcient to achieve competitive equilibrium (CE) outcomes in Edgeworth
exchange. Representation of supply and demand environments as Edgeworth exchange
environments helps address this issue, since we can regard models such as Rustichini, Sat-
terthewaite, and Williams [1994] – who analyze convergence to CE in the k-double auction
– or Gjerstad and Dickhaut [1998] – who simulate convergence to CE in a double auction –
as convergent models of bargaining in Edgeworth exchange. This is important for two rea-
sons. First, interpretation of these models as Edgeworth exchange economies in the special
case of quasi-linear utility may provide insights that facilitate their extension to models of
bargaining in Edgeworth exchange more generally. In addition, once extensions of bargain-
ing models to Edgeworth exchange are formulated, their restriction to the quasi-linear case
should be identical to their formulation in terms of supply and demand. Second, exten-
sion of bargaining models to general Edgeworth exchange economies is important because
of the possible impact of restricting the models to the case of preferences that don’t pro-
duce income eﬀects. This issue has been demonstrated by Hurwicz, whose critique of the
Coase theorem identiﬁes the limitations of restricting attention exclusively to the case of
quasi-linear utility.
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